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1. Introduction
Proponents of tranfer taxation argue that well-designed levies on estates
and gifts serve two primary objectives. First, such taxes may promote an
equitable distribution of economic resources by breaking up large con-
centrations of wealth. Yet many commentators have noted that common
estate-planning techniques allow wealthy individuals to transfer vast for-
tunes while paying little or no tax (see, e.g., Cooper (1979)). Accordingly,
it is possible that this first objective is served only in cases where indi-
viduals have little or no desire to avoid taxation. Second, transfer taxes
raise revenue. In practice, levies on gifts and estates have raised roughly
$6 billion per year over the last five years. This sum is certainly substan-
tial, but one should bear in mind that it represents less than 1 percent of
all federal revenues for the same period, despite the imposition of high
statutory marginal tax rates. One might therefore be inclined to conclude
that transfer taxation achieves the second objective with perhaps a modi-
cum of success.
Unfortunately, this conclusion is premature. To measure the true reve-
nues associated with transfer taxation, one must determine the net in-
cremental.contribution that these taxes make to total federal revenues,
or, to put it another way, one must estimate the amount by which total
revenues would decline if these taxes were eliminated. This figure may
bear very little relation to measures of collected revenue reported by the
government. In particular, many of the same estate-planning techniques
that allow wealthy individuals to escape transfer taxation also have im-
portant income tax implications. Thus, elimination of transfer taxes
might significantly affect income tax revenues.
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In this paper, I argue that, as a consequence of behavioral responses to
estate taxation, a substantial amount of capital income is taxed at lower
marginal rates under the personal income tax. I emphasize two major
channels through which this occurs. First, estate planners agree that per-
haps the best method of avoiding estate taxes is to make substantial intra
vivos gifts, and to make them as early in life as possible. Typically,
wealthy individuals can do this in ways that minimize or entirely elimi-
nate gift tax liabilities. The net effect is to transfer wealth, typically from
parents to children, during a period of life in which children tend to pay
lower marginal rates under the personal income tax. Although differ-
ences between marginal income tax rates alone create incentives for
wealthy individuals to make intra vivos gifts,1 the estate tax adds to this
incentive, presumably generating larger transfers. The government ef-
fectively forgoes a portion of its tax claim on incrementally transferred
assets. Second, since charitable bequests are deductible from gross es-
tate for tax purposes, the estate tax creates a substantial incentive to
make such contributions. Even though one might well deem this a desir-
able outcome, it is important to recognize that it too has important con-
sequences for the income tax. In this case, resources are transferred
from individuals with po )marginal tax rates to tax-exempt institu-
tions. As a result, the goment forgoes its entire claim on the trans-
ferred assets.
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to measure these effects pre-
cisely. The most important obstacle is the availability of extensive financial
data on a sample drawn from the wealthiest 5 percent of the population.
Although most of this information is, in principle, contained in federal
personal income, estate, and gift tax returns, the IRS is reluctant to re-
lease such information for fear of violating the confidentiality of wealthy
taxpayers. Even if this data became available, the measurement of intra
vivos transfers (which are often well disguised) would pose severe con-
ceptual difficulties. My strategy in this paper is to estimate true revenues
on the basis of the best available evidence. Since this evidence is admit-
tedly sketchy, it is appropriate to think of my calculations as suggestive
rather than precise.
Two major conclusions emerge from this study. First, the indirect ef-
fects of estate taxation on federal personal income tax revenue are poten-
tially of the same order of magnitude as the reported revenue collected
by this tax. Thus, these reported figures may lead one quite far astray.
1. For this reason, changes in the taxation of personal income affect estate tax revenues,
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Second, available evidence suggests that, historically, true revenues as-
sociated with estate taxation may well have been near zero, or even nega-
tive. Recent tax reforms that reduce the progressivity of federal personal
income tax rates only partially vitiate this conclusion. Far from "backing
up" the income tax as some have claimed, the estate tax may actually
generate a rise in income tax avoidance activities sufficient to offset reve-
nue collected through estate levies.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly review the
history of federal estate and gift taxes, paying special attention to pro-
visions that play prominent roles in the following analysis. I elaborate
upon the incentive effects of estate taxation in section 3,and present evi-
dence documenting significant behaviorial adjustments to changes in the
tax code in section 4. Section 5 contains estimates of net revenue raised
through estate taxation, which are adjusted to account for the behavioral
responses discussed in sections 3 and 4. In section 6, I turn myattention
to several additional considerations, some of which introduce poten-
tially countervailing forces. Special attention is given to various provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). Section 7 contains conclusions.
2. A Brief History of Federal Estate and Gift Taxation
The modem estate tax has been in effect since 1916. The original legisla-
tion provided for a $50,000 exemption, with progressive marginal tax
rates rising from 1 percent to 10 percent for estates over $10 million. The
gift tax was instituted in 1924. Rates ranged from 1 percent to 25 percent,
matching estate tax rates in the same year. Donors were provided with a
$50,000 exemption, plus a $5,000 annual exclusion per donee. As of
1932, gift tax rates were reduced relative to estate tax rates and remained
25 percent lower than estate rates through 1976.
From 1943 to 1976, the basic provisions of federal estate and gift taxes
remained essentially unchanged. The law provided for a $60,000 estate
tax exemption, with progressive rates ranging from 3 percent to 77 per-
cent. The gift tax exemption was fixed at $30,000, with a $3,000 annual
exclusion per donee. Decedents were allowed to bequeath one half of
their gross estates to their spouses tax free (the marital deduction), and
all charitable bequests were deductible. In addition, recipients of be-
quests were allowed to step up the basis on all assets for purposes of
capital gains taxation to the fair-market value of those assets at the time
of their benefactor's death. A step-up of basis was not allowed for assets
transferred by gift.
Congress significantly altered the structure of federal transfer taxes in116 BERNHEIM
the TRA of 1976. Most importantly, this act provided for unification of
estate and gift taxes. Since 1976, all cognizable transfers have been taxed
jointly under the same progressive schedule, which originally includes a
maximum rate of 70 percent. Lifetime giving is still slightly favored be-
cause the gift tax is imposed only on the net transfer, whereas the estate
tax base also includes amounts used to pay the tax. The act also estab-
lished a unified credit that provided tax relief equivalent to a $60,000 ex-
emption, but which was designed to rise in steps over a period of years.
The $3,000 yearly gift tax exclusion was retained, and the marital de-
duction was liberalized, so decedents could transfer the maximum of
$250,000 and 50 percent of gross estate tax free. Finally, Congress re-
moved the step-up of basis at death, but this provision was later repealed.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) embraced four major
changes to this system of transfer taxation. First, the unified credit was
increased in steps to a maximum of $192,800 in 1987 (equivalent to a
$600,000 exemption). Second, the maximum marginal tax rate was de-
creased in steps from 70 to 50 percent. Third, all limits on the marital
deduction were removed. Finally, the annual gift tax exclusion was raised
to $10,000.
3. Incentive Effects of Estate Taxation
In this section, I argue that the federal estate tax has generated strong in-
centives for individuals to transfer large amounts of accumulated wealth
to their intended heirs prior to death, and to do so as early in life as pos-
sible. Furthermore, I note that the deductibility of charitable bequests
enhances the attractiveness of leaving a portion of one's estate to charity.
In subsequent sections, I document the effects of these incentives on be-
havior and compute the attendant impact on federal personal income tax
revenues.
3.1 INTRA VIVOS GIFTS
Before 1977, the federal tax system treated gifts more favorably than be-
quests. Despite the unification of gift and estate taxes in the TRA of 1976,
virtually all estate planners still recommend a plan of systematic lifetime
giving as perhaps the most important method of transfer tax avoidance
(see Brosterman (1977), Kess and Westlin (1982), Esperti and Peterson
(1983), Clay (1982), and Cooper (1979)). Cooper argues that
The first major goal of good estate planning is to freeze the size of a client's estate
at its current level and divert future growth to the natural objects of the client's
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already accumulated, and good estate planning attempts to get estate-freezing
action into operation as soon as possible [emphasis added] so as to cut off
wealth accumulation before it becomes a more serious planning problem.
In practice, there are many ways to accomplish this while simultane-
ously minimizing or entirely avoiding gift tax liability. Since these plan-
ning techniques have been reviewed at length elsewhere, I will provide
only a brief summary of the major strategies.
3. Ti .1. Undisguised giftsSince a substantial amount of gifts is entirely ex-
empt from taxation, a simple plan of undisguised lifetime giving is, for
the majority of families, the most effective estate planning tool. By split-
ting gifts, a married couple can now transfer $20,000 ($6,000 prior to
1982) per year to each intended heir without incurring any gift tax lia-
bility whatsoever. Thus, a couple with two children could divest itself of
$1 million over a twenty-five year period simply by taking advantage of
the gift tax exclusion. If the couple is wffling to contemplate gifts to grand-
children or to spouses of children or grandchildren, the potential for
transfer tax avoidance grows enormously.
It is, however, essential to begin taking advantage of the gift tax exclu-
sion as early as possible. For one thing, the timing of each individual's
death is uncertain, and all assets remaining in his possession at the time
of his death are taxable as part of his estate. In addition, the exemption is
not cumulative, so failure to take advantage of it in any particular year
implies that one opportunity to make tax-free transfers has been lost for-
ever. This consideration may be quite important for very wealthy indi-
viduals who, despite programs of systematic lifetime giving, still expect
to die with substantial estates.
The TRA of 1976 also provides substantial unified credits against es-
tate and gift tax liabilities. At first, it might appear as though this pro-
vision treats gifts and bequests neutrally. However, this impression is
erroneous. As long as donors plan to exhaust the credit completely, its
value is inversely related to the date at which they choose to take it. This
principle is easily demonstrated. For simplicity, assume that the credit is
fixed at its 1987 level of $192,800 so that it corresponds to an exemption
of $600,000. Consider a wealthy man who, among other things, owns a
piece of property worth $600,000. He may transfer the entire parcel to
his heirs immediately without incurring any tax liabffity. Upon his even-
tual demise, his estate will pay taxes only on the residual assets. If, on
the other hand, he holds the property until his death, it will ordinarily
escalate in value. Suppose he dies ten years later and the property is then
worth $1 million. The first $600,000 would be exempt. However, his es-118 BERNHEIM
tate would then pay taxes not only on the residual assets but also on the
$400,000 gain.2 At current rates, this would imply an incremental estate
tax liabffity of between $150,000 and $200,000.
3.1.2. Diversion of Profitable Investment OpportunitiesPerhaps the most
common and informal estate planning activity entails the diversion of
profitable investment opportunities to one's intended heirs. Parents can
provide valuable information and advice concerning potential invest-
ments without incurring gift tax liability. In many cases, parents devote
great effort to locating and arranging profitable business deals and then
bring their children in as coinvestors. Such diversions do not generate
any incremental tax liabifities, even though their success may depend
upon expert services supplied by the parent. If children lack the nEces-
sary capital, parents can lend it to them. As long as these loans are made
at prevailing rates of interest and observe arms-length regulations, no
gift tax liability is incurred even if the child would have been unable to
obtain a similar loan from a third party. Alternatively, parents can help
their children to obtain a loan at favorable rates by guaranteeing repay-
ment, without risk of transfer taxation. Finally, parents can provide as-
surances that, should the deal fail, they will pick up the loss. In the event
a loss actually occurs, parents will be compelled to pay gift tax on the
associated transfer. However, from the point of view of a risk-averse
child, the parents' guarantee amounts to an insurance policy, the value
of which exceeds their expected loss.
For parents who own large portions of businesses or closely held cor-
porations, additional opportunities for diversions arise. In many cases,
parents can shift profitable activities from their primary business to a
separate partnership or enterprise owned partially or completely by
their children. Parents may also bring their children into a family part-
nership as silent partners, thereby diverting a share of the earnings and
appreciation from their business. To accomplish this while minimizing
taxable transfers, they must arrange the partnership as early as possible.
3.1.3 Sophisticated Estate Tax AvoidanceVarious sophisticated estate-
planning techniques allow wealthy individuals to transfer resources in-
tra vivos in ways that escape notice under the gift tax. Important tech-
niques are the use of preferred stock recapitalizations in closely held
firms, installment sales, and life insurance.
2. In general, only part of this gain will be due to inflation. Thus, the argument remains
valid even if the credit is indexed.DOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 119
In a preferred stock recapitalization, parents cancel outstanding com-
mon stock and issue in its place a combination of preferred and common
stocks. They distribute the preferred stock primarily to themselves (or
other current owners), the common stock primarily to their children
(or other intended heirs). If desired, this can be accomplished without
transferring significant control over the corporation to the children. By
selecting an appropriate dividend entitlement for the preferred stock,
the parent can reduce the value of the common stock to a negligible level,
reflecting only the speculative growth potential of the corporation. In
this way, parents entirely avoid the gift tax but succeed in transferring all
future corporate growth, brought about in part by their own expertise
and effort, to their children. One difficulty is that parents may be forced
to accept a high level of taxable personal income from the preferred
stock. Nevertheless, in many cases such income is desirable and estate
planners tend to recommend the recapitalization.
Installment sales are frequently used to transfer real property. Parents
sell this property to their children while simultaneously providing fi-
nancing. They then typically forgive interest payments as they come
due. In some cases, they use the property for business activities and
lease it back from the children. Rental payments then partially offset in-
terest payments, and the remaining interest is typically forgiven. All for-
given interest is potentially taxable as a gift. The primary advantage of
the installment sale is that parents can transfer all accumulation on the
entire parcel immediately, despite the fact that the bulk of actual gifts
(forgiven interest payments) will not be made for many years. In addi-
tion, when parents use the property for business activities, they may be
able to develop it with the ultimate benefit eventually accruing free of tax
to their children. Finally, it is even possible to provide, as part of the
terms of the original sale, that the installment payments will terminate
upon the parents' death, without drawing the unpaid portion into the
parents' estate. The primary disadvantage of the installment sale is that it
forces parents to realize a capital gain. However, they can defer realiza-
tion by using balloon payments. Furthermore, upon the parents' de-
mise, it appears possible to largely eliminate capital gains obligations on
the remaining portion.
Life insurance provides a particularly attractive estate planning tool
for highly paid executives. It is quite common for corporations (particu-
larly those closely held) to provide their executives with large amounts
of life insurance as a fringe benefit. An executive may assign ownership
in this insurance to prospective heirs, thereby excluding it from the es-
tate. Although premiums over a certain threshold are taxable to the ex-120 BERNHEIIvI
ecutive under the personal income tax, assignment of ownership in such
a policy to heirs is apparently not cognizable as a gift. As a result, this
scheme completely avoids transfer taxes. Since this arrangement can be
used for ordinary life insurance as well as group term insurance, the net
effect can be to transfer resources into an accumulating whole life policy.
Since investment income accruing to policyholders within life insurance
companies is tax exempt, the government thereby forgoes its entire claim
on the transferred assets until the executive's death.
3.1.4 EvasionMany families presumably engage in simple gift tax eva-
sion. It is certainly possible for individuals to make substantial gifts in
forms that are difficult, if not impossible, for the IRS to trace. Outright
gifts of cash and durable goods (clothes, furniture, appliances) fall into
this category.
Each of these techniques for avoiding estate and gift taxes has the ulti-
mate effect of transferring resources from parent to child at a relatively
early date. Indeed, in most cases, effective planning requires these trans-
fers to be made as early as possible. To the extent children face signifi-
cantly lower marginal rates under the personal income, significant losses
of tax revenue may result.
It is important to bear in mind that wealthy individuals are not solely
motivated by the desire to minimize taxes. Indeed, estate planners em-
phasize that this goal often conflicts with other legitimate concerns, such
as retaining control over one's assets, maintaining one's desired stan-
dard of living, and providing one's children with appropriate incentives.
Proper estate planning balances the costs and benefits of tax avoidance at
the margin. For this very reason, we would expect changes in the tax treat-
ment of gifts and bequests to affect intra vivos transfers significantly.
3.2 CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
Incentives for charitable giving arise directly from the deductibffity of
such bequests for estate tax purposes. If, for example, an individual
faces a marginal estate tax rate of 50 percent, she can by forgoing $0.50 of
bequests to her heirs provide $1 to charity. The effective price of contrib-
uting $1 to charity is therefore only $0.50 (in general, this price is $(1
- t), where t is the testator's marginal estate tax rate). Sophisticated estate
planners may also recommend the use of front-end trusts, which pro-
vide that the income from an estate be used for charitable purposes over
some specified period, after which all assets are returned to the dece-
dent's heirs. Such an arrangement can virtually eliminate all estate taxes
while preserving substantial value for one's descendants.DOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 121
4. Behavioral Evidence
The estate tax creates strong incentive for wealthy individuals to make
intra vivos gifts and charitable bequests; however, this does not neces-
sarily imply that these tax incentives have a significant effect on behav-
ior. Accordingly, I now present empirical evidence concerningactual
behavioral responses. As we shall see, the evidence strongly supports
the view that these responses are extremely large.
4.1 INTRA V1VOS TRANSFERS
Unfortunately, data on gifts are virtually impossible to obtain, in part be-
cause they are often disguised as other sorts of transactions(recall the
discussion in section 3). Although one can obtain some information on
trusts from IRS fiduciary income tax data, it is not possible to distinguish
between the formation of revocable and irrevocable trusts. A revocable
trust is not a consummated gift and is therefore treated as part of the
donor's assets for tax purposes. As a result, this data is uninformative.
One can, nevertheless, document the sensitivity of intra vivos trans-
fers to tax code provisions indirectly. Note in particular that the choice
between making a gift or a bequest is essentially one of timing. Parents
can transfer wealth to their children immediately orhang on to it for
some time, eventually making the same transfer upondeath. This deci-
sion is therefore closely related to the choice of whether to bequeath as-
sets to one's spouse or directly to one's ultimate heirs. In this case, the
couple can choose to transfer wealth to its children immediately upon
the death of the first spouse, or hang on to it and eventually make the
same transfer upon the death of the second spouse.3 Again,the issue is
simply one of timing. However, unlike intra vivos transfers, ample infor-
mation is available concerning bequests to spouses. Furthermore, ERTA
fundamentally changed the tax treatment of spousal bequests as of 1982
by eliminating all limitations on the marital deduction. In addition, the
reduction of tax rates in 1977 somewhat diminished the penalty asso-
ciated with double taxation of wealth passed first to one's spouse and
eventually to one's ultimate heirs. Finally, the reduction of maximum tax
rates in 1982 somewhat vitiated the importance of planning for very
wealthy decedents to split transfers to children or other ultimate heirs
evenly between spouses' estates. Thus, by examining trends in spousal
bequests over the last ten years or so, one can infer the importance of
3. One obvious difference is that an individual might not be sure that his or her spouse
would make the same bequests later on that he or she would have made. However, it is
possible to overcome this difficulty through the use of a trust,122 BERNHEIM
estate tax provisions in determining the timing of transfers to ultimate
heirs.4
To measure behavioral responses to changes in the tax code, I will
compare IRS statistics on bequests to spouses from 1977 and 1983 re-
turns. Most returns filed in any year concern the estates of individuals
who died in the previous year. Thus, the 1977 returns primarily contain
estates treated under 1976 law (pre-TRA of 1976), and the 1983 returns
consist primarily of estates taxed under ERTA.
Since the filing requirement changed dramatically between 1976 and
1982 (from $60,000 to $225,000), the 1977 and 1983 returns reflect radically
different samples. In addition, data are only available on 1983 returns for
which the gross estate exceeded $300,000. To restore comparabffity, one
must restrict attention to 1977 returns on which reported gross estate is
sufficiently large. In particular, the $300,000 threshold is, adjusting for
inflation, roughly equivalent to $180,000 in 1976. Unfortunately, the IRS
is no longer willing to release data on individual returns, so it is nec-
essary to employ aggregated statistics. The IRS does, however, report
sample averages for these data, grouped by size of gross estate. Thus, it
is possible to restrict attention to 1977 returns on which the gross estate
exceeded $150,000 or $200,000. In practice, we consider all estates ex-
ceeding a $200,000 threshold, in part because this is closer to $180,000,
and in part because this selection criterion produces a sample of 59,553
returns. Given their similar sizes, there is every reason to believe that
4. Unfortunately, this period also witnessed the adoption of significant income tax reforms
(under ERTA). Thus, changes in gift and bequest behavior may reflect a combination of
effects (see footnote 1). One would not, however, expect income tax provisions to sig-
nificantly affect the fraction of bequests left to spouses, because after the testator's
death, all primary heirs (spouses and children) will ordinarily pay similar high-bracket
marginal personal income tax rates. In addition, the limitation of the marital deduction
was undoubtedly the single most important tax-related determinant of spousal be-
quests, and its elimination probably swamped all other effects. For these reasons, data
on spousal bequests may actually be preferable to data on intra vivos transfers.
Table 1 A COMPARISON OF 1977 AND 1983 ESTATE TAX RETURNS
1977 Returns 1983 Returns
Minimum gross estate in sample
Percent gross estates of married
decedents left to spouses
Percent married decedents claiming
marital deduction
Percent gross estates of all
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these two samples reflect nearly identical segments of the population. I
should mention, however, that the use of $150,000 (rather than $200,000)
as a selection criterion would not significantly alter my conclusions.
Comparison of statistics for these samples reveals the following pat-
tern (see Table 1). For returns filed in 1977, married individuals left
$O.477 out of every dollar to their spouses. For returns filed in 1983, this
figure climbed to $0.594 on the dollar, a net increase of 24.5 percent.5
Although this response is enormous, one might well wonder why it
was not even more pronounced. After all, ERTA allows individuals to
transfer unlimited resources to their spouses absolutely tax free. There
are at least three explanations. First, individuals may adjust their wills
somewhat slowly in response to changes in estate tax provisions. In-
deed, one should recall that 1982 was the first year in which decedents
were allowed an unlimited marital deduction; this deduction may have
been used to an even greater extent in subsequent years. Second, many
decedents exhausted the benefit of the marital deduction by driving
their estate taxes to zero. Indeed, 78.6 percent of those claiming the
marital deduction paid no tax. Overall, the effective tax rate on married
decedents was a mere 4.7 percent, as compared to 17.5 percent for the
rest of the sample. Third, even with an unlimited marital deduction, it is
not always optimal to bequeath all assets to a surviving spouse, since
this strategy could lead to a large estate tax liability upon the death of the
second spouse.
A comparison of 1977 and 1983 returns also reveals an increase in the
frequency with which individuals claimed the marital deduction (refer
again to Table 1). For the 1977 returns, 102 out of every 1,000 married
decedents failed to claim this deduction. By 1983, this figure had fallen
to 47 out of every 1,000 married decedents, a decline of 53.9 percent.
One cannot attribute this trend to the elimination of limitations on the
marital deduction under ERTA, since those not claiming the deduction
were not constrained by these limitations. Rather, this trend is a direct
reflection of the decline in estate tax rates, which reduce the penalty as-
sociated with transferring wealth first to one's surviving spouse, and
subsequently, upon the spouse's death, to one's heirs.
Overall, this evidence confirms the view that the timing of transfers to
one's ultimate heirs is extremely sensitive to estate tax provisions. Ac-
cordingly, there is a strong presumption that intra vivos gifts exhibit a
similar sensitivity.
5. After subtracting liabilities such as funeral and administrative expenses, debts and mort-
gages, one finds that bequests to other heirs increased by roughly the same proportion.124 BERNHEIM
4.2 CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
Previous investigators have directly estimated the effect of estate tax pro-
visions on charitable bequests (see, e.g., McNees (1973), Feldstein (1977),
Boskin (1976), Barthold and Plotnick (1983), and Clotfelter (1984)). In gen-
eral, these estimates suggest that the behavioral response is extremely
large. For example, Clotfelter found that a 1 percent rise in the effective
price of charitable bequests (see section 3.2) would cause such bequests
to decline by roughly 1 percent, and perhaps by as much as 1.5 percent.
Clotfelter used his estimates to simulate the effect of ERTA on charitable
giving. On the basis of his calculations, he predicted that ERTA would
depress charitable bequests by 34 percent to 52 percent.
In this instance, economists have the rare opportunity to determine
the accuracy of a prediction based upon econometric estimates of be-
havioral responses by examining actual responses pursuant to a policy
change. Unfortunately, the IRS has not made any data on estate tax re-
turns available for any year between 1977 and 1983. Thus, of necessity,
the data samples used here span both the 1976 and 1981 tax reforms. Ac-
cordingly, any changes in behavior reflect responses to both acts. On the
other hand, ERTA was phased in over several years, so its full effect was
not felt in 1982. These two factors roughly offset each other, so that one
can still obtain a feel for the accuracy of Clotfelter's predictions by com-
paring charitable bequests across two samples.
Specifically, we find that for 1977 returns, decedents left $O.0809 out of
every dollar to charity. By 1983, this figure had fallen to $O.0505 on the
dollar (see Table 1). The magnitude of this decline (37.6 percent) is
roughly in line with the low end of the range of possible responses pre-
dicted by Clotfelter. Since, once again, individuals may adjust their wills
slowly in response to changes in estate tax provisions, the observed re-
sponse should be thought of as a lower bound. Actual experience there-
fore provides striking confirmation of ex ante econometric forecasts.
Having established that estate taxation not only creates incentives for
intra vivos giving and charitable bequests but also that these incentives
have an enormous impact on behavior, we now consider the implications
for personal income tax revenues.
5. True Estate Tax Revenues
I have argued in previous sections that reported estate tax revenue fig-
ures may be quite misleading. To calculate true revenues, one must net
out indirect effects. As a first step, it is essential to determine proper
methods for measuring revenues. When an individual holds an asset,DOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 125
the government effectively owns some claim on that asset. However, the
value of the government's claim depends in a fairly complex way upon
the individual's marginal tax rate and upon his or her behavior.
Consider, for example, the effect of transferring a consol worth $1
from one taxpayer to another. Suppose that the interest rate is 10 per-
cent, so the consol pays $0.10 each year. Taxpayer A is now, and always
wifi be, in the 50 percent marginal tax bracket. Furthermore, suppose
that A would hold the consol indefinitely, consuming all of the after-tax
income it produces. If A owns the consol, then the government has a
claim on a stream of $0.05 payments in every subsequent year. Taxpayer
B is now, and always will be, in the 25 percent marginal tax bracket. Fur-
thermore, B would also hold the consol indefinitely, consuming exactly
its after-tax proceeds. If B owns the consol, then the government has a
claim on a stream of $0.025 payments in every subsequent year.
To compare these streams with measures of current revenues, one
must calculate present values. The appropriate discount rate for the gov-
ernment is the after-tax rate of return for some average government
bondholder (see Feldstein (1974)). Suppose that this average bondholder
is in the 40 percent tax bracket. Then if A owns the consol, the value of
the government's claim is $0.833, whereas if B holds the consol, the value
of this claim falls to $0.417. Accordingly, if some policy induces A to give
B the consol, the government loses $0.417.
I remarked earlier that the value of the government's claim depends not
only upon the individual's marginal tax rate but also upon his or her be-
havior. To illustrate, suppose that A and B would, if given the consol, sell
it immediately (before receiving any income) to C and consume all the
proceeds. Then any policy that induces A to give the consol to B obviously
has no income tax implications, despite differences in the marginal tax
rates of these individuals. This hypothetical case raises a general point: as
taxpayers' marginal propensities to consume their resources rise, the
value of the government's claim on their wealth falls. Since investments
produce taxable income, reinvestment is tantamount to transferring a
portion of the after-tax claim to the government. If, as one would expect,
wealthy individuals have higher propensities to reinvest, then transfers
of assets from high- to low-bracket taxpayers will have an even greater
impact on income tax revenues than indicated by the preceding hypo-
thetical calculation.
Although I have cast this discussion in terms of a consol, the same rea-
soning applies equally well to all coupon bonds (by roffing these over,
one can effectively produce a consol). Since capital gains have always re-
ceived special treatment under the tax law, analogous calculations for
stocks and real property are a bit more complex. One must specify the126 BERNHEIM
fraction of earnings paid out as current income (dividends or rent) and
the frequency with which individuals turn over assets, in addition to
marginal tax rates and propensities to consume. Details of all such com-
putations appear in the Appendix.
Throughout the following analysis, I employ the revenue valuation
formulas derived in the Appendix. I assume a nominal interest rate of
8 percent. In addition, I take the dividend/earning ratio on stocks to be
0.5. Finally, I assume that investors turn over about 10 percent of their
assets each year. This implies that corporate shares are held on average
for 10 years (see King (1977)). I make no special calculations for real es-
tate holdings, but treat them analogously to stock.
5.1 INTRA VIVOS TRANSFERS
I now turn to the problem of estimating the indirect revenue effects of
induced intra vivos transfers. The first task is to measure the average
ratio of gifts to bequests in a given year. I infer this ratio by combining
several available figures. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) estimated that in
1974 total intra vivos transfers were approximated 1.56 times the size of
intergenerational bequests.6 Unpublished data collected by Paul Men-
chik and Martin David from 1967 estate tax records and reported by
Kotlikoff and Summers allow us to determine the fraction of gross es-
tates bequeathed across generations by sex and marital status of the de-
cedent. Combining the MenchikDavid figures with estate tax data on
the distribution of gross estates over the same categories of decedents, I
find that approximately $0.338 out of every dollar of gross estates is be-
queathed across generations. Thus, for every dollar of reported be-
quests, individuals concurrently transfer approximately $0.527 (= 1.56 x
$0.338) intra vivos. One can, use this figure to estimate the likely mag-
nitude of gifts in any desired year. For example, in 1983 the total value
of all gross estates exceeding $300,000 was $50.4 billion. Accordingly,
surviving individuals of similar economic status (age adjusted) prob-
ably transferred about $26.5 billion (= 0.527 x 50.4 billion) intra vivos
in 1983.
Specifically, they estimated that transfers across generations totaled about $70 billion,
and they attributed approximately 60.9 percent of this to intra vivos transfers. Intra
vivos transfers include life insurance policies in which the incidents of ownership have
been transferred to the beneficiary and which are therefore exduded from gross estate.
One could question this calculation on several grounds. First, wealthy individuals have
more incentive to engage in estate planning and therefore probably make a larger frac-
tion of their transfers intra vivos than do average individuals. For this reason, the cal-
culation probably understates the true magnitude of such transfers. Second, a number
of significant tax reforms took place between 1974 (the year for which Kotlikoff and
Summers made their calculations) and 1983. These reforms included (i) the unification ofDOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 127
Not all of this is attributable to the estate tax. However, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude on the basis of the evidence presented in section 4
that elimination of estate levies would have reduced this number by at
least25percent. I have already argued that this evidence probably unders-
tates the true behavioral response for a variety of reasons. Indeed, estate
planners often emphasize that lifetime gifts have various adverse nontax
consequences, including loss of control over resources and premature
enrichment of one's children, and they often recommend that individuals
consider such transfers only if the tax advantages are deemed suffi-
ciently important (see, e.g., Kess and Westlin(1982)).It therefore seems
more likely that the estate tax motivates closer to50percent, and con-
ceivably as much as75percent, of lifetime gifts. I will present separate
calculations for each of these assumptions(25, 50,and75percent).
The actual revenue loss associated with the transfer of an asset worth
$1 depends upon several factors. The first is the nature of the tax system
prevailing subsequent to the transfer, and the associated marginal tax
rates of the concerned parties. I will provide separate calculations for hy-
pothetical policy regimes in which pre-ERTA and ERTA income tax rate
schedules are assumed to persist indefinitely, as well as similar calcula-
tions for the1986TRA. Table2contains marginal tax rate assumptions
for donors, recipients, and average bondholders for each tax system.
Note that I always place the donor in the highest tax bracket. The recipi-
ent's marginal tax bracket under the current law corresponds roughly to a
married individual reporting taxable income (after deductions) of $30,000
per year. I will return to these assumptions at the end of this section.
The second important factor concerns the propensity of each individ-
ual to consume out of current income. I consider two cases. In Case I, the
gift and estate taxes, (ii) the reduction in estate tax rates, (iii) the reduced progressivity
of income tax rates, and (iv) the liberalization of the unified credit and yearly gift tax
exclusion. The first three factors would tend to reduce intra vivos giving, but the fourth
has the opposite effect. In view of the enormous importance of the unified credit and
yearly exdusion to most individuals, I suspect that the $26.5 billion figure is, if anything,
on the low side.
Table 2 MARGINAL INCOME TAX RATE ASSUMPTIONS
Donor Recipient Average bondholder
pre-ERTA 0.7 0.25 0.5
ERTA 0.5 0.25 0.4
TRA of 1986 0.28 0.15 0.23128 BERNHEIM
donor consumes one half of realized nominal income, but the recipient
consumes all of it. For Case II, I change the recipient's marginal propen-
sity to consume to 0.7. Both cases reflect an assumption that, over the
relevant time period, recipients tend to consume a higher fraction of cur-
rent income. I expect this pattern because recipients usually anticipate
substantial gifts and bequests in the future and are therefore less in-
clined to save. Although the difference between the marginal propen-
sity to consume of donors and recipients does somewhat affect my re-
sults, the actual levels of these parameters appear to make very little
difference.
The third factor concerns the timing of the gift. If the donor chose not
to make an intra vivos transfer of wealth, the recipient would inherit this
wealth upon the donor's death anyway. Consequently, my calculations
should reflect lost revenues only between the time of the gift and the
donor's eventual death. I will refer to this as the "acceleration factor." In
section 3, I argued that good estate planning requires individuals to
transfer resources as early in life as possibl. Although I present calcula-
tions using acceleration factors of five, fifteen, and thirty years, I tend to
prefer those based upon the larger figures.
The fourth and final factor concerns the nature of transferred assets. I
present separate calculations for stylized stocks and bonds (see the Ap-
pendix for details). The characteristics of actual assets might differ from
case to case.
Tables 3 through 5 contain results. Each entry in these tables indicates,
under specified assumptions, the revenue loss (in cents) induced by a
private transfer of assets worth $1. Unfortunately, I have no direct evi-
dence either on actual acceleration factors or on the composition of as-
sets transferred intra vivos. To avoid conveying a false sense of precision,
I simply eyeball these tables and select a figure that corresponds roughly
to an acceleration factor between fifteen and thirty years and a portfolio
consisting of stocks and bonds in equal proportions. For pre-ERTA in-
come tax law, I surmise that the revenue loss per dollar transferred was
close to $0.40; for ERTA, it was roughly $0.20; for the 1986 TRA, it is
somewhere between $0.10 and $0.20.
In Table 6, I calculate the displacement factor (i.e., the fraction of intra
vivos transfers attributable to estate taxation) and the value of lost in-
come tax revenues under alternative sets of assumptions about the reve-
nue loss per dollar of transferred wealth. I take the total value of intra
vivos transfers for the target population to be $26.5 billion, which cor-
responds to the estimated level of such transfers in 1983. My preferred
estimates of revenue loss per dollar transferred, combined with a dis-DOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 129
Table 3 LOSS PER DOLLAR TRANSFERRED-PRE-ERTA (IN CENTS PER
DOLLAR)
Case I Case II Acceleration
factor Bonds Stocks Bonds Stocks
Table 4 LOSS PER DOLLAR TRANSFERRED-ERTA (IN CENTS PER
DOLLAR)
Case I Case II Acceleration
factor Bonds Stocks Bonds Stocks
Table 5 LOSS PER DOLLAR TRANSFEREED-TRA OF 1986 (IN CENTS PER
DOLLAR)
Case I Case II Acceleration
factor Bonds Stocks Bonds Stocks
Table 6 REVENUE LOSS FROM INDUCED INTRA V1VOS TRANSFERS (IN
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Revenue loss per
dollar of wealth Displacement factor
transferred 0.25 0.5 0.75
5 16.6 6.4 16.3 6.4
15 45.0 18.3 42.3 18.1
30 77.2 33.8 68.8 31.5
5 9.4 3.9 9.1 3.8
15 26.7 11.2 24.3 10.9
30 47.0 20.8 40.7 19.5
5 4.9 2.8 4.7 2.7
15 14.1 8.6 12.6 8.3
30 25.5 17.2 21.5 16.0
0.1 0.7 1.3 2.0
0.2 1.3 2.7 4.0
0.3 2.0 4.0 6.0
0.4 2.7 5.3 8.0
0.5 3.3 6.6 10.0130 BERNHEIM
placement factor of 0.5, generate the following conclusions. Under the
highly progressive pre-ERTA income tax rates, income tax losses associ-
ated with intra vivos transfers induced by the estate tax would amount to
between $4.5 billion and $5 billion. Under ERTA rates, this figure would
be between $3 billion and $3.5 biffion. By making the income tax system
less progressive, the 1986 TRA would reduce this loss to perhaps $2 bil-
lion (the effect of this Act is somewhat vitiated by the removal of the capi-
tal gains exemption). To put these numbers in perspective, one should
bear in mind that the federal government collected $5.17 billion from
levies on estates with gross values exceeding $300,000 in 1983.8
It is unfortunately not entirely appropriate to compare revenue loss
calculations based upon the level of intra vivos transfer in 1983 with es-
tate tax revenues in 1983 for two of the three tax regimes. Income tax
rates during this period were established by ERTA, and taxpayers prob-
ably expected these rates to persist indefinitely. I have already remarked
that differentials between marginal personal income tax rates by them-
selves provide incentives for individuals to make gifts rather than be-
quests. Had taxpayers expected pre-ERTA income tax rates to prevail
after 1983, the division of transfers would probably have been more
skewed toward gifts. Accordingly, official estate tax revenues would have
been lower, and the true revenue picture would have been even worse.
Conversely, had taxpayers expected the 1986 TRA rates to prevail after
1983, the division of transfers might have been more skewed toward be-
quests. Although this would make the total revenue picture a bit better
than my calculations suggest, I suspect that the resulting bias is very
small.9
At this point, it is appropriate to reflect on the accuracy of the marginal
tax rate assumptions employed throughout this exercise. For a number
of reasons, these may be erroneous. First, the children of wealthy individ-
uals may in many cases be wealthy themselves, especially after accumu-
lating significant gifts. Second, even comparatively wealthy individuals
may have relatively low taxable incomes upon retirement. Third, it is well
known that many taxpayers shelter enormous amounts of income. Some
may even drive their marginal tax rates to zero through vigorous use of
Total estate tax revenues were slightly higher than this, because before 1984 the filing
requirement was below $300,000. Unfortunately, the IRS has only released data on es-
tates with gross values exceeding $300,000 for 1983. Accordingly, my calculations are in-
tended to approximate the true net revenue associated with taxing this group.
According to my calculations, transferring an asset worth $1 intra vivos lowers the
present value of income tax payments by approximately $0.20 under ERTA rates and
$0.15 under TRA rates. The effect of this reform on intra vivos transfers should therefore
be more or less equal to the effect of cutting the estate tax rate by only 5 percent. Other
aspects of the TRA may reduce this effect even further. See the discussion in section 6.3.DOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 131
provisions such as the investment tax credit. On the other hand, many of
the techniques discussed in section 3 for avoiding estate tax also allow
such individuals to pass surplus tax shelters to their children, thereby
reducing income tax revenues through a related channel. One should
also recall that several techniques (i.e., the use of life insurance and pen-
sion funds) provide for free accumulation subsequent to the transfer. In
addition, children may often use transferred funds to purchase homes,
in which case subsequent implicit income escapes taxation entirely. Fi-
nally, my calculations completely ignore the revenue losses associated
with avoidance activities that reduce gross estates below the filing re-
quirement. It is, however, impossible to account properly for any of
these factors without access to currently unavailable IRS records.
5.2 CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
I now turn my attention to charitable bequests. In1983,decedents with
gross estates exceeding$300,000left approximately$2.5billion to chari-
ties. To calculate the indirect impact on income tax revenues, one must
first determine the fraction of this attributable to estate taxation.
I employ Clotfelter's behavioral estimates to compute the impact on
charitable bequests of eliminating estate taxation. Using parameters from
his most conservative case,1° I find that charitable bequests would de-
cline by79.3percent, or, for1983,about$2billion. Such bequests would
have all but disappeared for estates under $1 million and would have
fallen by more than 76 percent for estates exceeding $1 million.
What is the revenue loss per dollar bequeathed to charity? Here, the
relevant comparison is between having the family retain the wealth in-
definitely, passing the unconsumed portion from generation to genera-
tion, and having it bequeath the same wealth to a tax-exempt institution.
I assume that the family is always taxed at the highest statutory marginal
rate, and I calculate revenue losses per dollar of transferred assets. Table
10. For estates of less than $1 million, I assume price and income elasticities of 1.6 and
0.4, respectively, and a marginal estate tax rate of 39 percent. For estates exceeding $1
million, these figures are 1.0, 0.4, and 45 percent, respectively.





TRA OF 1986 68.3 111.6132 BERNHEIM
7 contains results for stylized stocks and bonds under the three tax sys-
tems considered earlier. Again I eyeball this table and select figures that
roughly reflect a portfolio divided equally between stocks and bonds.
Under pre-ERTA income tax law, the revenue loss exceeded $1.50 on
each dollar of induced charitable bequests, or (for 1983 levels of chari-
table bequests) about $3 billion in the aggregate. For rates prevailing sub-
sequent to ERTA, the loss appears to have been about $1.25 on each
dollar, or $2.5 billion in the aggregate. Under the tax reform bill, the loss
is between $0.80 and $1 on the dollar, or between $1.5 billion and $2 bil-
lion in the aggregate.
I have presented estimates of revenue losses from intra vivos giving
and charitable bequests for three hypothetical policy regimes in which,
respectively, pre-ERTA, ERTA, and TRA income tax rates are assumed to
prevail and to persist indefinitely after 1983. Combining these estimates
produces striking results. Under my preferred assumptions, estate taxa-
tion would have induced a net loss of federal tax revenues roughly equal
to $3 billion in 1983 for the highly progressive pre-ERTA income tax re-
gimes. The estate tax probably would have broken even in 1983 or even
generated a small loss under the ERTA income tax regime (the total net
reduction of income tax revenues, $5.5 billion to $6 billion, slightly ex-
ceeds official estate tax revenues for the target group). For rates adopted
in the 1986 IRA, indirect losses would have been in the neighborhood of
$3.5 billion to $4 billion, or roughly 70 to 80 percent of reported reve-
nues. Even under the more conservative view that estate taxation is
responsible for only 25 percent (rather than 50 percent) of intra vivos
transfers, true revenues would stifi have been negative under pre-ERTA
income tax rates, perhaps 10 percent of reported revenues under ERTA,
and less than half of reported revenues under the TRA rates.
I caution against attaching too much importance to any particular set
of numbers. It seems clear that indirect revenue effects may be large rela-
tive to reported revenues, but available data simply do not permit pre-
cise calculations.
6. Additional Considerations
6.1 ANCILLARY EFFECTS OF SOPHISTICATED ESTATE
PLANNING TECHNIQUES
The income tax implications of many estate-planning techniques are com-
plex. In addition to shifting income between taxpayers, some techniques
create taxable income, and others generate new shelters. A complete
analysis of all indirect effects would represent a major undertaking. For
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against techniques in cases where they would create significant income
tax liabilities. I have, for instance, already remarked that the preferred
stock recapitalization is typically applied only when the parent desires a
high level of current income for his or her personal purposes.
6.2 STEP-UP OF BASIS AT DEATH
Another factor that deserves careful consideration is the step-up of basis
at death for income tax purposes. If the estate tax causes individuals to
transfer assets through gifts that they would otherwise have held until
death, then, upon the eventual sale of such assets, total capital gains tax
liabilities will be greater. Although this consideration somewhat vitiates
our conclusions, I suspect that it is of comparatively minor importance
for four reasons.
First, individuals concerned with tax avoidance clearly have an incen-
tive to transfer intra vivos all assets that they do not intend to hold until
death before transferring any assets that they never intend to sell. Thus,
the relevant question is whether or not donors tend to turn over mar-
ginal assets at regular intervals. The evidence presented in section 5 sug-
gests that affluent individuals transfer roughly one third of their total
holdings intra vivos and two thirds at death. Thus, as long as these indi-
viduals tend to turn over at least one third of their assets, I would not
expect them to retain the marginal asset until death.
Second, if a parent is inclined to hold onto an asset for his or her entire
life, the heirs may well feel similarly inclined. This is particularly true
when the asset in question is a family business or closely held corpora-
tion. Thus, the date of eventual sale may be quite distant even at the time
of the parent's death, in which case the discounted value of the incremen-
tal tax would be quite small.
Third, when individuals hold assets until death, they often go to great
lengths to undervalue these assets, thereby minimizing estate tax lia-
bffity. In fact, Cooper (1979) points out that, through manipulating a se-
ries of special factors that cause tax courts to reduce the assessed market
value of assets (particularly in closely held corporations), decedents have
succeeded in sheltering as much as two thirds of actual asset value for
estate tax purposes. Of course, in the process, these decedents also lose
the step-up of basis.
Fourth, families that deliberately avoid estate tax may also be fairly so-
phisticated about avoiding income tax. In particular, by appropriately
timing the realization of gains and losses, taxpayers may be able to mini-
mize, or even entirely eliminate, capital gains tax liabffities (see Stiglitz
(1983)). Although it appears that very few investors do this in their daily
portfolio management (see Poterba (1985)), they may well find it worth-134 BERNHEIM
while to do so when realizing large gains on assets that have been held
for a very long time.
Consideration of the step-up of basis at death raises a related issue.
This provision probably does not significantly vitiate my conclusions,
but it may well deter taxpayers from transferring intra vivos substantially
more assets than they do already. Indeed, estate planners agree that by
removing the opportunity to pass on property at death free of capital
gains tax, Congress would "increase greatly interest in estate tax avoid-
ance" (Cooper (1979, p. 11)). Accordingly, such action would be likely,
on balance, to depress federal revenues, contrary to common wisdom.
6.3 THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
Throughout this discussion, I have emphasized that the 1986 TRA re-
duces the progressivity of federal income tax rates and thereby attenu-
ates the revenue loss per dollar diverted from bequests to gifts. The Act
may also have other important effects, to which I have alluded only
briefly. Specifically, this decline in progressivity by itself reduces incen-
tives for intra vivos transfers. Under the new Act, we might therefore
expect both bequests and estate tax revenues to be higher, whereas the
marginal effect on lifetime giving of eliminating the estate tax might well
decline.
However, the Act also introduces countervailing forces. First, it elimi-
nates several opportunities for wealthy individuals to accumulate re-
sources tax free (e.g., through individual retirement accounts (IRAs)).
Second, it removes numerous tax shelters (e.g., the investment tax credit,
the capital gains and dividend exclusions, investment interest deduc-
tions, and passive business loss offsets) through which many wealthy
individuals currently achieve significant reductions in their marginal tax
rates. The net effect of these changes remains to be seen.
In addition, I have been somewhat conservative by assuming that
wealthy parents will face marginal income tax rates of 28 percent. The
Act includes a surcharge on taxable income between $71,900 and $149,250
for couples ($43,150 and $87,560 for single individuals) that may well
produce an effective marginal tax rate of 33 percent for many wealthy
taxpayers.
Other provisions also bear on these issues to a lesser degree. Un-
earned income for children under fourteen is now counted as taxable in-
come for the parent; this somewhat attenuates the ability of parents to
arrange significant transfers of resources very early in life. The Act also
curtails income splitting through trusts, eliminates the advantages of
Clifford and Spousal Remainder Trusts, and strengthens the GenerationDOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 135
Skipping Tax. Yet it is difficult to imagine that these provisions would
have a large effect on the overall picture described here.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, I have suggested that the indirect effects of estate levies on
personal income tax revenues are extremely large relative to estate tax
collections. Although it is very difficult to estimate these effects pre-
cisely, in recent years true estate tax revenues may well have been nega-
tive. I have emphasized that these conclusions are highly dependent
on the progressivity of the personal income tax,but I have also shown
that indirect revenue effects would continue to be extremely important
even under the new tax reform bill. Accordingly, commonplanning tech-
niques severely cripple the ability of the federal government to achieve
the dual purposes of promoting equity and raising revenue through es-
tate taxation.
Nevertheless, the existence of this tax does appear to effect a diversion
of substantial resources (upward of $2 billion per year) to charity, and
many may view this as sufficient justification for its retention.Further-
more, avenues for curtailing estate tax and gift tax avoidancehave not yet
been fully exhausted. By pursuing such avenues, the federal government
might well succeed in reducing large concentrations of wealth while sig-
nificantly enhancing total federal revenue. Yet in the absence of far-
reaching reform, it seems unlikely that the estate tax will do much more
than benefit charitable causes.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we derive formulas that express the value of the gov-
ernment's claim on a privately held asset as a function of the holder's
characteristics, the tax system, and the nature of the asset.
First, consider a bond (consol) that pays $i per year forever. Suppose
that the interest rate is i, so the value of the bond is $1. Each year, the
bondholder, whose marginal tax rate is m, consumes a fraction y of
nominal after-tax income generated by the bond and reinvests the re-
mainder in new bonds. Bonds pay interest at the beginning of each year
starting in year 1, so at the end of year t the investor owns bonds worth
(1 + i(1 - m)(1 -
and pays taxes of
im(1 + 1(1 - m)(1 -136 BERNHEIM
in period t + 1. If ifi is the marginal tax rate of the average bondholder,
the present discounted value of this revenue stream through year T is
Tim(1 + i(1 - m)(1 - y))t_1
t=1 (1 + (1 -
1 1
=mL(1-(1y)(l - m)
1(1 + i(1 - m)(1 -
L 1+(1fl)i)
To calculate the revenue loss associated with transferring the bond from
one taxpayer to another for a period of T years, we simply calculate the
change in the value of this expression associated with changing the val-
ues of m to y.
Next, consider a stock that, in year 0, represents a claim on capital
assets worth $1. These assets yield after-corporate income tax earnings
of $p at the beginning of each year, starting in year 1. The company
always pays out the fraction a of earnings as current dividends and re-
tains the remainder, investing it in new capital assets. Thus, at the end of
year t, one share of stock represents a claim on capital assets worth
[1 + p(l - a)]t.
Let A denote the number of shares of vintage 'r stock (shares bought
in period t) that the investor stifi holds at the end of period tT. We take
A8 = 1. Each year, the investor sells a fraction A of his stock, irrespective
of vintage. Thus,
A = A (1 - X)t_T(1)
He consumes the fraction y of realized after-tax nominal income and re-
invests the proceeds in stock. Once again, we use m to denote the
investor's marginal tax rate andto denote the marginal tax rate of the
average bondholder. In addition, we assume that the fraction e of real-
ized capital gains is exempt from taxation. Accordingly, in period t, the
investor pays taxes of
R = mA{pa(1 + p(l -
+ A(1 - e)[(1 + p(l - a))t - (1 + p(l - a))kJ}(2)DOES THE ESTATE TAX RAISE REVENUE? 137
and purchases
A = (1 + p(l - a))tA{pa(1 - y)(l - m)(1 + p(l - a))t-1
+ X(1 + p(l - a))'[l + (1 - y)(e + (1 - m)(1 - e))
((1 + p(l - a))t_c - 1)J}(3)
shares of new stock. Although we were unable to obtain a nice closed-
form expression for total revenues, (1)-(3) form a system of difference
equations that can be solved numerically. We then value the revenue
stream by discounting, as above.
As a final step, we relate pto i through capital market equffibrium con-
ditions. Under traditional views of capital market equilibrium (see Pot-
erba and Summers (1985)),
i(1-m)
a(1 - m) + (1 - a)(1 - z)
where
X(1 -e)m
A + i(1 - m)
is the effective tax rate on capital gains (see King and Fullerton (1984)).
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